一個人落腳倫敦大橋

Over dinner on Saturday, debate raged about Ukrainian politics and the economic crisis, which has hit particularly hard here. Will unpopular President Viktor Yushchenko bother to run in next year's presidential elections? Is ex-speaker of parliament Arseniy Yatsenyuk a viable candidate? Who is to blame for the severity of the crisis? Perhaps it was the samogon, but one word I don't remember featuring much was "Russia".

So imagine my surprise when, reading CiF on Sunday, I was
emphatically informed that "to really understand Ukrainian politics is to view it not through the prism of left versus right, but to look at it as east v west". In his article, Adam Hug, policy director of the Foreign Policy Centre, which was established under the patronage of Tony Blair, argues that Ukrainian politics is defined by a split between pro-Russia and pro-west factions. Arguments about the path the country negotiates between Russia and the west certainly play a highly visible role in political battles. But the misconception that this is the defining quality of politics here presents a major stumbling block to understanding Ukraine, and therefore to forming a sensible policy towards it.

Where does this misconception come from? Sadly, the main source is biased or lazy reporting in the media, which all started with the simplistic coverage of the Orange revolution in 2004. Russian political technologists working for the ruling clan cynically tried to frame the election campaign as an existential question of east versus west. Poorly informed journalists, hastily flying in from Moscow, often took up this simple, exciting geopolitical narrative: Russia and the west were facing off against each other in Ukraine. (The same happened after the war in South Ossetia.) This crystallised the idea in many minds of two halves of Ukraine, pitted against each other in an east versus west battle. But, from a Ukrainian perspective, this was not the story: the Orange revolution was really about the attempt of a corrupt and reviled ruling clan to throw the elections. (I recommend Andrew Wilson's "Ukraine's Orange Revolution" for a thoroughly researched and well-argued analysis.)

Misguided Russian commentators argue that the beneficiary of the protests, President Yushchenko, is now disastrously unpopular because of his perceived Ukrainian nationalism or anti-Russianness. In fact, Yushchenko's unpopularity comes from his failure to deal with the problems that the Orange revolution targeted: primarily, the concentration of power and money among a venal elite who are immune to prosecution.

As the economic crisis hits Ukraine harder than most, "pro-Russia" opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych's ratings are rising, while Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's and Yushchenko's are dropping. Have Ukrainians suddenly rediscovered their love for Russia? Of course not. Since the start of the economic crisis last autumn, I have been in many parts of Ukraine, from Donetsk in the east, to Ivano-Frankivsk in the west, Kiev in the centre and Crimea in the south. In all of these places, the primary complaint is the authorities' failure to deal with the country's problems and build a strong economy. In "pro-west" Ivano-Frankivsk, people openly told me that they would vote for Yanukovych because of Yushchenko's and Tymoshenko's failures. While a "division" between the country's west and east does to a certain extent exist, its boundaries are mobile and its influence varied.

Despite its evident ineffectiveness as a political tool, Yushchenko is now trying to use Tymoshenko's relatively good relations with Moscow to portray her as the Russian candidate for president in next year's elections and a traitor to Ukraine. His support of under 5% demonstrates the continuing failure of this policy. But Hug, it appears, has taken Yushchenko's statements about her attempts to procure a loan from Russia at face value. This interpretation is then backed up by glaring factual errors. "Why has Moscow decided to offer a $5bn loan to Ukraine?" he asks. It hasn't. Tymoshenko asked, and Moscow said it was considering the request. She also sent the request to other countries. Hug also suggests that a crucial moment in the coming days will be "when Tymoshenko flies out again to meet her counterpart in Moscow to discuss the political aspects of the deal between the countries." Again? She never went to negotiate on the loan and, as far as I know, has no plans to fly to Moscow.

This is not to whitewash Tymoshenko, but to get away from the practice of fitting Ukrainian politicians into the category of pro-west or pro-Russia. This can help the western reader to get some bearings, but can also be confusing. In fact, Tymoshenko is not pro-west, nor pro-Russia; she is pro-Tymoshenko. Positions are rarely adopted by politicians according to deep-seated beliefs, but in line with electoral expediency, or the needs of financial backers.

Of course Russia plays a role in Ukrainian politics. I certainly would not disagree that that role is often a negative one, and that the EU could and should be doing more to help and encourage Ukraine. But , by overplaying the importance of an ideological Russia versus west split in Ukraine, Hug is, paradoxically, dancing to Russia's tune.

These failings would seem to bring into question the "innovative"
approach of Hug's Foreign Policy Centre. Wading through its website's New Labour-speak, the sum of its "joined-up thinking" seems to be that its analysts aren't country specialists and work on "issues" rather than specifics. Which sounds lovely and modern, but begs the questions: Did Hug come to Ukraine? Did he speak to Ukrainians, or indeed anyone who lives and works here? Or did he, as it would appear, cobble together his ideas from a few western newspaper reports?

The FPC's website suggests that its mission is to create "a new way of working which differs from traditional approaches to foreign policy." Perhaps it's unfair to judge a think tank on one article, even if it is written by its policy director, but, if this is the FPC's "new way", I'd suggest it look for another one. A third way, you could say. Now there's some joined-up thinking.